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The recent waves of asylum seekers to Europe have placed economic integration at the top of the policy agenda. Successful labor market integration of refugees and family immigrants is crucial for the migrants themselves as well as for the social and economic consequences of the influx. Evidence across European destinations shows, however, that, in most countries, employment rates of refugee and family immigrants from developing countries fall considerably below those of comparable natives (OECD, 2015; Dumont et al., 2016; Dustmann et al., 2016) .
In northern Europe and the Nordic welfare states, differentials are particularly large (Åslund et al., 2017; Bratsberg et al., 2017; Frattini et al., 2017; Sarvimäki, 2017; Schultz-Nielsen, 2017) .
Several studies also suggest that the low employment rates of immigrants from developing countries are not only due to a slow and halting integration processes after arrival, but also reflect a disproportional risk of exiting the labor market after they appear to be successfully integrated (Husted et al., 2001; Bratsberg et al., 2010; Kirdar, 2012) . The implication is that job loss, and its consequences for future employment opportunities, plays an important role in explaining differences in long-term economic outcomes between immigrants and natives.
This study addresses the sources and consequences of job loss that is not voluntary or caused by misconduct, and hence exogenous from the individual workers' point of view. We explore two main reasons why involuntary job loss may have particularly severe impacts on the employment and earnings patterns of immigrants. First, immigrants can be more exposed to job loss, either because they happen to work in firms, industries, and occupations that are prone to closure and downsizing, or because they are more likely than their native coworkers to be selected for layoff during downsizing processes, e.g., because they hold marginal jobs or have short tenure. Second, job displacement may have particularly severe consequences for immigrants, as they typically possess less general human capital directly applicable in the hostcountry labor market and have inferior majority language skills, social capital and networks when compared to native workers (Dustmann et al., 2015) .
Methodologically, we follow a large literature examining the individual consequences of job loss by means of comparing employment and earnings paths for separated and non-separated workers (Hamermesh, 1987; Ruhm, 1991; Jacobson et al., 1993; Neal, 1995; Kletzer, 1998; Hallock, 2009; and Huttunen et al., 2011) . The major challenge is to identify the causal effects of involuntary job loss on future earnings and employment, with a need to disentangle effects of job loss from systematic differences in outcomes between displaced and non-displaced workers that are causally unrelated to the displacement event. While displacement studies typically compare stayers and displaced workers originating from the same firm, we define "treatment" at the firm level and include future outcomes of all workers, in line with two recent studies based on Norwegian register data (Rege et al., 2009; Bratsberg et al., 2013) . Our identification strategy relies heavily on heterogeneity across firms in the degree to which their employees are exposed to the risk of layoff. While the role of firm heterogeneity has been emphasized in recent studies of wage inequality (e.g., Card et al., 2013) and immigrant-native wage differences (Aydemir and Skuterud, 2008; Barth et al., 2012) , there is little empirical evidence on the importance of immigrant job allocation across firms when it comes to employment shocks. Yet, the very same mechanisms that lie behind the observed underrepresentation of immigrants in high-pay firms are likely to generate a similar immigrant overexposure to workplace downsizing and bankruptcy.
The empirical analyses build on administrative registers from Norway covering all private sector employees and firms from 1994 through 2010. By combining data from employer-employee registers with records from bankruptcy court proceedings, we identify all incidences of mass layoffs and firm closures in this period. We consider two types of firm events-bankruptcy and major downsizing-and use workers in stable (non-treated) firms to measure counterfactual outcomes. The motivation is twofold. First, distinguishing involuntary from voluntary separations is not possible by administrative register data only. The reason for the observed separation is not filed, many workers leave because they receive a better offer elsewhere, and a large fraction of workers who actually lose their job will find a new job without ever registering as unemployed and thereby disclosing the involuntary nature of the separation.
Second, by focusing on all workers in closing firms, or those exposed to mass layoffs, we avoid any selective processes that may take place within the firm. Although infrequent, bankruptcies have, from a research point of view, the great advantage of causing almost indisputably involuntary job loss. When we consider workers in downsizing firms, this approach has an intention-to-treat flavor, as only a fraction of the "treated" workers are actually laid off.
However, when we consider mass layoffs in bankruptcy firms, we know with certainty that all workers are displaced. Thus, we can circumvent some otherwise tricky selection issues and obtain consistent estimates of the individual effects of job loss for immigrants and natives, respectively.
Our study consists of three parts. First, we examine the extent to which immigrants more than natives tend to work in firms exposed to major downsizing and closure events. Compared to natives, migrants from developing countries (LDC) are more likely to work in firms that are going to scale down or close down over the next few years. We find that their observed "overexposure" to a full closure event is 55 percent. Second, we analyze the causal impacts of such events for immigrants and native workers, with a focus on subsequent employment and earnings outcomes. The adverse consequences of being exposed to such events -in form of lower subsequent employment and earnings -are significantly larger for LDC migrants than for natives. In contrast, migrants from western European countries (EEA) exhibit very similar patterns to those of natives, both in terms of exposure and effects. Third, we extrapolate our findings from these rare events to explain why immigrants are more likely to leave employment due to job loss in general. The implied relationship between exogenous job loss and the probability of becoming unemployed provides information that we use to estimate the total exposure to job loss. Further, the causal effects identified by bankruptcies are used to predict the overall impact on subsequent employment and earnings growth, for immigrants and natives respectively. Over a two-year period, LDC immigrants face a 130 percent higher probability than natives of involuntary dismissal. Combining this finding with the estimated effects of job loss, we conclude that the combination of higher job loss rates and more severe effects of job loss accounts for 50 to 60 percent of the higher three-year transition rate out of employment and lower earnings growth of LDC immigrants.
I.
Exposure to firm bankruptcy and downsizing
The employer-employee data we use in our empirical analyses are collected from We divide the population of workers into three groups based on country of origin. The first group consists of immigrants from developing countries (LDC). The LDC immigrant category comprises labor and family migrants from Pakistan and Turkey, and refugees, asylum seekers, and family migrants from Vietnam, Bosnia, Sri Lanka, Iraq, Iran, Chile, Kosovo, and Somalia-the 10 major low-income source countries in the immigrant labor force during our study period.
The second group counts immigrants from countries in Western Europe (EEA; i.e., pre-2004 European Union and European Free Trade Association member states). 1 Labor migrants from Sweden, Denmark, the UK, and Germany dominate this group. The third group consists of natives, defined as persons born in Norway to two Norwegian-born parents. While we use complete population data for the two immigrant groups, we use a 10 percent random sample of natives (and reweight the data to account for this sampling).
1 Although Norway has stayed outside the European Union, the 2004 and 2007 eastwards enlargements of the union opened the Norwegian labor market to citizens of accession countries owing to Norway's EEA membership. Our EEA sample does not include the wave of labor migrants for Eastern Europe that followed, however, as our methodological design, where we track workers in the labor market for ten years, entails that the recent cohort would be dropped from the analyses.
Each year, approximately ten percent of all private-sector jobs in Norway disappear (Salvanes, 1997; Bratsberg et al., 2013) . This section provides an overview of the extent to which native and immigrant workers are exposed to major downsizing and closure events. More specifically,
in Table 1 we look at the incidence of downsizings and closures over a three-year period. The reason why we use a three-year perspective here rather than focusing on, say, downsizings and closures occurring the next year only, is worker behavior. We expect a considerable sorting process to take place over a period prior to downsizing and closure events, as workers start to leave the presumably "sinking ship." Including events that occur further into the future reduces -though does not entirely solve -this potential selection problem. This improvement comes at a cost, however, as additional measurement error is introduced by the fact that some of the workers assumed to be exposed to the adverse employment shock in reality will have left the firm well before realization of the shock (for reasons unrelated to the forthcoming downsizing or closure). Table 1 here As columns (1) and (2) reveal, native workers in private-sector firms have a 8.1 percent chance of being exposed to a major downsizing event and a 1.8 percent chance that the firm they work for goes bankrupt over the next three years. 2 LDC immigrants are considerably more exposed to displacement with an 11.0 percent probability of the firm downsizing and a 2.8 percent probability that the firm goes bankrupt. In other words, a bankruptcy is 55 percent more likely for an LDC immigrant worker than for a native, whereas experiencing a major downsizing is 35 percent more likely. EEA immigrants also appear to be overexposed to downsizing events, although to a lesser extent than LDC immigrants.
In columns (3) to (5) we investigate whether differential exposure to adverse employment shocks is explained by firm characteristics (industry affiliation, size, ownership) and/or by individual human capital characteristics. The estimates are from linear probability models where the outcome of interest is an indicator for whether or not the firm of employment will undergo a major downsizing or closure event during the upcoming three calendar years.
As shown in column (3), without any control variables LDC immigrants have a 4.0 percentage points (or 41 percent) higher probability of exposure to a downsizing or closure event than natives, whereas EEA immigrants have a 1.7 percentage points (19 percent) higher probability.
Controlling for industry (with 87 dummy variables) and calendar year reduces the differential for LDC immigrants somewhat, suggesting that these immigrants indeed are overrepresented in risky industries; see column (4). Yet, large and statistically significant differences remain.
Accounting for differences in individual human capital variables (educational attainment, age, work experience in Norway, and tenure) as well as firm characteristics reduces the immigrantnative differentials further, indicating that LDC immigrants to a certain degree are sorted into precarious firms due to their lower levels of human capital and work experience (column 5).
Regardless of the underlying sorting mechanism, the fact that immigrants are considerably overrepresented in declining and dying firms is bound to have consequences for their relative labor market performance.
II. Identification of job loss effects
As job loss is anything but randomly assigned across workers, it is not trivial to identify the causal impact. A common approach used in the literature compares displaced workers to colleagues who retained their job (Jacobson et al., 1993; Couch and Placzek, 2010) or to similar workers in other firms (Huttunen et al., 2011) . As layoffs can be selective with respect to worker characteristics, studies typically focus on major downsizings. 3 To avoid any remaining bias from non-random layoffs, we follow Rege et al. (2009; 2011) and Bratsberg et al. (2013) and classify workers according to the downsizing and closure status of their firm rather than according to individual worker displacement, focusing on closures due to bankruptcy and events where firms drastically reduce their staff.
Despite our efforts to exploit layoff events that are exogenous in the sense that they have not been affected by the individual worker's own behavior, we cannot rule out non-random sorting of workers into firms that vary according to their downsizing or closure probability. Hence, we evaluate the effects of involuntary layoff within the framework of a regression analysis where we control for potential confounders, i.e., variables that may be correlated with both the probability of being exposed to downsizing and closure events and future labor market
performance. This includes all observed human capital characteristics as well as observed labor market performance indicators prior to the base year.
The regression equations will have the following structure: In this methodological setup, where future employment and earnings of workers who in the base year work in stable firms constitute the counterfactual for those affected by an adverse firm shock, there remain a number of challenges to identification. These challenges are related both to change in the composition of employees within firms in the period leading up to the layoff or closure event, and to systematic differences between firms (and their workers) 4 Specifically, we define a major downsizing in a year as a reduction of the firm workforce by at least 60 percent during that year. We override the downsizing indicator if at least 60 percent of the workforce work together in another firm during the same year (i.e., in a different firm, interpreted as a reorganization event) or if the workforce moved back above the 40 percent mark in the next year.
( , )
I   exposed or not exposed to an adverse event in the near future. To ensure internal validity, we impose a number of sample restrictions aimed at minimizing the influence of sorting within and between firms.
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First, job separations caused by a downsizing or closure event may occur long before the mass layoff actually takes place; hence, the stock of employees at the time of the event may already be selected. To circumvent this problem, we condition the causal analysis on firm stability over a period up to the major displacement event. More specifically, in the main empirical analysis the data are constructed as follows: For each base year t0=1994,…,2010, we identify private sector full-time workers aged 25-55 in firms that have not undergone any major downsizings in either of the years t0-2, t0-1, t0, or t0+1. Then, in year t0+2, some of the firms downsize or close down, and some do not. The purpose of our analysis is to study how these events affect employment and earnings outcomes from year t 0 +3 onwards. This setup involves sources of attenuation bias, as firms not experiencing a displacement event in t 0 +2 may do so in t 0 +3 or later. In particular, a firm which in a given year is subject to a forthcoming closure, will for the baseline observation in the prior year be defined as stable, even though it will close down in three years. In a set of robustness analyses, we therefore redefine the group of untreated (stable) firms as firms without any major downsizing or closure event over the full outcome period.
Second, in very small firms we cannot rule out that the employees themselves influence the displacement event in question, in which case these events may not be orthogonal to the residual ijt  . To minimize this potential source of bias, we exclude firms with fewer than ten employees in the base year.
Third, a number of workers move in and out of firms at a relatively high frequency, often on temporary contracts (e.g., as substitute workers) and with intermittent spells of unemployment. As the prevalence of such contracts may vary systematically between firms according to their future downsizing or closure status, we seek to ensure a certain degree of worker homogeneity across firm types by conditioning on stable employment up to and including the base year. More specifically, we require that the worker was employed and did not receive welfare benefits (including unemployment insurance) in each of the past three calendar years and has more than 365 days of tenure in the firm at the end of the base year. In separate robustness analyses, we relax these worker stability conditions.
Even though we include an extensive set of control variables in Equation (1), it is probable that systematic unobserved differences remain between employees in firms on the verge of a major displacement process and those in stable firms. To address this concern, we conduct a set of robustness analyses where we in Equation (1) substitute initial firm fixed effects for the industry effects. To further isolate coworkers, we restrict the fixed-effects analyses to the last base year the firm is observed in the data. With only one observation per firm, a drawback is that the main effects of bankruptcy and downsizing are absorbed by the fixed effects. In these analyses, our focus is therefore on the differential impacts for immigrants and natives. The major advantage of the approach is that estimates reflect differences in post-displacement outcomes comparing immigrant and native coworkers from the same firm and exposed to the same downsizing or closure process.
Finally, particularly in the immigrant population, a probable response to job displacement is to leave the country (Bijwaard et al., 2014) . In the main part of our analyses, we condition the samples on continued residency in Norway through the respective outcome periods. However, in additional robustness analyses presented in Section 5, we also include outmigrants in the analysis populations.
III.
Effects of adverse employment shocks
III.1 Descriptive patterns
Before turning to the regression analyses, we present some key descriptive patterns for the samples of workers used to identify and estimate the causal impacts of job displacement. As Table 2 shows, the additional sample restrictions result in far lower exposure rates to adverse firm shocks than in the overall workforce (refer back to Table 1 ). The differences between the three groups have also become smaller, particularly for downsizing events. Yet, immigrant overexposure to bankruptcies remains large-with 53 percent higher exposure for LDC immigrants and 29 percent for EEA immigrants when compared to native workers. Table 2 here
The three demographic groups also differ in terms of observed characteristics. LDC immigrants are younger and have less work experience, shorter tenure and lower educational attainment than EEA immigrants. 6 As we only account for post-migration labor market experience, both immigrant groups have fewer years of experience and have shorter tenure with the firm than natives of the same age.
The impacts of downsizing and bankruptcy events on future labor market outcomes are illustrated in Figures 1 through 3, separately for natives and the two immigrant groups. The figures illustrate how three key outcomes -unemployment, employment, and annual earnings -evolve over a ten-year window from three years before to six years after the base year for exposed and non-exposed workers. In the figures, year zero denotes the base year (the last of three years with conditioned employment), whereas year 2 (marked with a vertical line) is the year of the potential downsizing or closure event.
First, Figure 1 shows the patterns of registered unemployment incidence over time and across groups. Unemployment is here defined as being registered as an unemployed job seeker with the employment agency by the end of any month during the calendar year. Not surprisingly, workers exposed to a bankruptcy have much higher unemployment incidence than workers in stable firms, and this applies to immigrants as well as natives. Employees in firms with a major 6 Experience counts years with earnings from work exceeding the base amount of the public insurance system, and tenure is computed from the start date in the job record. Educational attainment is collected from the national education database. Attainment is missing for 4.5 percent of the records in the LDC immigrant regression sample and 5.9 percent of the EEA immigrant sample. For these records, we impute years of schooling from the mode attainment of workers with the same 4-digit occupation code.
downsizing are also more prone to unemployment; whereas not all employees are laid off, the incidence is much lower than for bankruptcies. The higher observed incidence among LDC immigrants may in part reflect that they have less seniority in the firm, and therefore more likely directly affected by the downsizing event.
Figure 1 here
An important reason for discussing Figure 1 is that the figure entries provide insight into the relationship between job loss and unemployment incidence. By definition, a closure due to bankruptcy is known to imply that all employees lose their job. The fact that "only" 40 percent of native workers in this category register as unemployed during the year of firm closure, shows that a slight majority of displaced native workers either are able to find new employment in time to avoid an intermittent unemployment spell, or pull out of the labor market. For LDC immigrants, the fraction registering as unemployed is somewhat higher (about 50 percent),
indicating that these workers to a lesser extent than natives find a new job in time to circumvent a spell of unemployment. Based on these numbers, it is possible to use the observed rates of registered unemployment for workers in non-closing firms to back out the approximate fraction of job loss in these firms-a point to which we return in section 7.
Figures 2 and 3 display patterns of employment and labor earnings relative to the base year for workers in closing, downsizing and stable firms. It is evident that workers employed in firms that go bankrupt there are few signs of convergence even four years after the closure event. A negative employment effect is indicated for all groups, regardless of immigrant background.
However, the immediate negative employment shock appears to be much larger for LDC immigrants than for natives and EEA immigrants. The pattern is similar for the responses to major downsizings, although the magnitudes of the effects, as expected, are much smaller than for bankruptcies. Table 3 presents our estimated effects of bankruptcy and downsizing on employment and earnings. The first outcome is a dichotomous variable indicating employment in the year after the potential closure/downsizing event (i.e., in year t 0 +3). The second outcome measures the average employment rate over three years, extending the post-displacement period. Similarly, the log earnings outcome is annual for year t 0 +3 and log average real annual earnings over the three-year period following any bankruptcy or downsizing event. The estimated effects of a bankruptcy, or a major downsizing, are given by the regression coefficients in Table 3 Downsizing also affects short-run employment. The effects are less severe than those of bankruptcy, as expected. The impacts of downsizing events can be interpreted as "intention to treat" effects as a fraction of the workforce remains with the firm. The employment effect for natives is a negative 1.4 percentage point. Again, the adverse employment effects are considerably larger for LDC immigrants. Actually, the short-term employment loss for LDCs is four times that of natives, suggesting that LDC immigrants are strongly overrepresented among workers laid off in the downsizing process. Earnings losses from working in a downsizing firm 7 Given the log earnings specification, observations with zero earnings are dropped. This is a minor problem in our samples, however, particularly for the three-year outcome where only 0.5 percent have zero earnings all three years.
III.2 Effects of displacement on employment and earnings
are also significant and estimated to 0.060 log points for natives. Again, earnings of LDC immigrants are more adversely affected with an effect estimate of -0.158 log points.
Moving on to the three-year averages, we first note that the sample means reveal that the average employment differential for LDC immigrants, relative to natives, is -0.075 over the three-year period after a possible closure. The earnings gap is 0.357 log points, see column (4).
Turning to the regression results in panel B, with all available control variables included in the specification, we find that a bankruptcy reduces the subsequent average three-year employment rate of natives by 5.3 percentage points (column 2), indicating a persistent job loss effect that is slightly reduced over time. The more severe employment loss for LDC immigrants also persists as those exposed to bankruptcy have an average employment drop of 9.8 percentage points over the three-year period following firm closure. Earnings also fall when we extend the post-displacement period. Natives exposed to a bankruptcy experience a drop in earnings of 0.221 log points over the three-year period. Again, LDC immigrants take an extra hit (of 0.109 log points), implying an earnings drop of 0.330 log points due to firm bankruptcy. Even the impacts of a downsizing are long lasting. For both natives and immigrants, the downsizing effects on employment and earnings in the extended outcome period are very similar to the short run effects.
III.3 Effects of displacement on labor force exit and unemployment insurance uptake
Prior studies of labor market performance of LDC immigrants in Norway document rising rates of labor market withdrawal with years since immigration, often through enrollment in the disability insurance program (Bratsberg et al., 2010; . In light of the large employment effects uncovered in Table 3 , one might expect that exposure to bankruptcy is part of the explanation for the increasing non-participation rates. In Table 4 , we therefore address the impacts of bankruptcy and downsizing on subsequent labor force withdrawal and receipt of unemployment insurance benefits. According to panel A, LDC immigrants are three times more likely to exit the labor force, here defined as not being employed nor registered as unemployed during the calendar year. Even for unemployment insurance, the share of LDC immigrants with benefits is three times that of natives. Note that employment in Table 3 and unemployment insurance in Table 4 are not mutually exclusive as some employed individuals may receive UI benefits for part of the year. Table 4 here
According to the estimates in Table 4 , exposure to a bankruptcy significantly affects both labor force exit and UI benefits receipt. Compared to the short-run employment effect of -0.057 (see Table 3 ), the labor force exit effect of 0.031 suggests that about one half of the drop in native employment owes to withdrawal from the labor force. Unlike for employment, there is no significant additional effect for LDC immigrants. When we consider unemployment benefit receipt, however, the bankruptcy effect is significantly larger for LDC immigrants. In magnitude, the UI effect of bankruptcy is much larger, in absolute terms, than the employment effects, reflecting that workers exposed to firm closure are much more likely to experience short unemployment spells during a year (of employment). The bankruptcy estimates in Tables 3 and   4 show that effects on employment and unemployment benefit receipt are more severe for LDC immigrants, but that the impact on labor force participation is the same as for natives.
Turning to the impacts of a major downsizing, we find positive effects on labor force withdrawal as well as unemployment benefit receipt. Unlike for bankruptcies, the effect on labor force participation is stronger for LDC immigrants than for natives. Compared to the employment effects of Table 3 , however, the magnitude of the differential effect on labor force participation is limited. Overall, adverse firm shocks have modest effects on labor force exit. The vast majority of LDC immigrants directly affected by such shocks remain in the labor force, but are much more likely to claim unemployment benefits than comparable native workers.
IV. Robustness checks
Even conditional on the extensive set of control variables, there is some risk that downsizing and closure events might be correlated with unobserved worker characteristics that also affect post-displacement outcomes. In fact, there is some indication that workers exposed to bankruptcy, in particular, differ from other workers in their industry. When we reestimate the models underlying Tables 3 and 4 after removing all individual worker characteristics from the list of control variables, estimated effects of bankruptcy become slightly larger for both natives and LDC immigrants (downsizing effect estimates remain largely unaffected); see Appendix   Tables A1 and A2 .
In terms of unobserved characteristics, concerns about identification relate both to the composition of employees within firms as well as between firms depending on their downsizing or closure status. In Table 5 , we examine the sensitivity of results to relaxing various restrictions on what workers we include in the sample, focusing the analysis on the intermediate-run
outcomes measured over the three-year period following any job displacement. The first concern is selective outmigration. Job loss arising from bankruptcy and downsizing is likely to trigger mobility, and for migrants who become unemployed, returning to their country of origin represents a relevant alternative. In our baseline analyses, we conditioned results on the populations that remain in Norway throughout the outcome period. If, for example, employer bankruptcy triggers outmigration of those with the highest earnings potential, the remaining group will be negatively selected, and the observed effect of bankruptcy on future labor market outcomes would appear more severe than the true effect. Table 5 here In the first two columns of Table 5 , we include in the sample workers who left Norway (in any year after t0), with outcomes still capturing employment and earnings in Norway only. 8 As can be seen from the sample sizes, very few outmigrated in total and the scope for bias from selective outmigration is therefore limited. In fact, when we compare estimates in Table 5 , columns 1 and 2, to the baseline estimates in Table 3 , columns 2 and 4, results are strikingly similar. The one exception is the estimated effect of downsizing on employment of EEA immigrants, which now becomes larger and statistically significant, reflecting their much higher outmigration propensity (Bratsberg et al., 2007) . For coefficients of the bankruptcy terms, there is no sign that failure to account for outmigration renders biased estimates.
To ensure a certain degree of worker homogeneity, our baseline sample restrictions excluded workers with short tenure and non-employment or social insurance claims during the threeyear base period. A legitimate concern is that such sample selection criteria may have different implications for LDC immigrants than for other workers, as stable employment in a stable firm may itself be an endogenous outcome of their labor market integration process. In Table 5 , columns (3) to (6), we relax these restrictions. Again, the exercise has little impact on key coefficient estimates; our baseline results appear robust to such sample concerns, as point estimates are similar to those in Table 3 , both in terms of magnitude and precision. Table 6 addresses robustness with respect to unobserved sorting of workers across firms. In the baseline approach, changes in employment and earnings of workers in stable firms represent the counterfactual outcomes for workers in firms that close down or downsize. One might worry that these counterfactuals are affected by sorting, whereby "good" firms attract workers with above-average employment and earnings trajectories. To account for such heterogeneity across firms, in columns (1) and (3) we therefore include firm fixed effects in the specification.
In this robustness check, we limit the sample to one observation year per firm, because repeated observation years would be subject to similar concerns about changes in the composition of the workforce in years before and after downsizing events. With one observation year per firm, the effect of an event common to all workers in the firm is not identified in the fixed effects regression, explaining the absence of main effect estimates in columns (1) and (3). Differential effects across groups are however identified, intuitively by the difference in post-displacement outcomes between immigrant and native coworkers within the same firm. To further ensure that results are not driven by the sampling procedure, in columns (2) and (4) we also report estimates from the reduced sample but without initial firm fixed effects; these columns confirm that the additional effect estimates for LDC migrants are the same as in the full sample. Even more important, however, the initial firm fixed effects estimates confirm that the displacement effects on employment and earnings of LDC immigrants are more severe than those of native workers. Indeed, coefficient estimates of the interaction term between bankruptcy and LDC immigrant are very similar across specifications with and without firm fixed effects and there is no indication that our baseline estimates are impaired by bias caused by differential sorting of immigrant and native workers across firms. Table 6 here Some of the firms we classify as stable according to their status in year t 0 do actually downsize or close down later during the outcome window. That is, in our baseline setup there are nontreated employees who become treated at some point during the period. In Table 6 , columns (5) and (6), we investigate how exclusion of outcome observations of workers in stable firms that close down or undergo a major downsizing during the outcome window affects our estimates. Not surprisingly, reducing this source of contamination yields estimates of main effects that are slightly more negative than those reported in Table 3 . Once again, coefficient estimates of interaction terms for LDC migrants are very similar to those of the baseline sample.
The strategy of identifying job loss effects by means of firm events hinges on an (implicit)
common trends assumption as workers in stable firms are used to form counterfactual estimates for workers in firms with adverse employment shocks. A standard procedure to back up the plausibility of this assumption is the pre-treatment test. In our case, this is a falsification test where we estimate the "effect" of future firm bankruptcy and downsizing events on (preperiod) employment and earnings of workers. In Table 7 , we follow this line of reasoning and check whether pre-displacement outcomes, measured by the average employment rate (columns 1 and 2) and log average earnings (columns 3 and 4) over the three-year period preceding the base period (i.e., years t 0 -5 to t 0 -3), correlate with bankruptcy or downsizing exposure in year t 0 +2. As the table shows, there is no indication that, conditional on the sample restrictions and the explanatory variables included in the regression, workers in firms that go bankrupt had lower employment and earnings than other workers seven to five years before the bankruptcy. Equally important, the table shows that, in the pre-treatment period, differential outcomes between LDC immigrants and natives were similar for workers in stable and bankrupt firms. In other words, there is no indication that our key results reflect differential pre-treatment trends in outcomes of LDC immigrants and natives who worked in firms that remained stable or went bankrupt two years after the base period. Table 7 here
Overall, the checks in this section show that a number of potential concerns about our identification strategy turn out to be unfounded. Our estimated effects of displacement on employment and earnings of native and immigrant workers appear robust to a large set of sample and specification checks, both in terms of structure and magnitude.
V. Immigrants or characteristics of immigrants?
If effects of job loss are heterogeneous across skills, the fact that LDC migrants possess different skills could potentially explain why they, on average, suffer more from negative shocks to their workplace. Studies of unemployment incidence and duration show that highly educated individuals are less prone to experience unemployment and, if they do, have shorter spell durations than the less educated (see, e.g., Nickell, 1979; Røed and Zhang, 2005) . Indeed, Hoynes et al. (2012) show that low-education workers were more severely affected by the Great Recession than workers with high educational attainment. This raises the question of whether the more adverse effects of job displacement uncovered for LDC immigrants simply reflect lower average educational attainment when compared to EEA immigrants and natives, and that, were we to compare workers with similar qualifications, there would be no differential effects of displacement across groups. 9 If so, the additional impacts observed for immigrants are due to their characteristics rather than their immigrant status.
We investigate this interpretation by augmenting the empirical models so that they allow for effects of bankruptcy and major downsizing events to differ by educational attainment, actual work experience, and tenure. The extended model specification even includes three-way interactions, permitting any effect heterogeneity to vary across immigrant and native workers.
As it turns out, only the interactions between the displacement events and education were significantly different for LDC immigrants and natives. Hence, in Table 8 , for the purpose of brevity, we focus on the education interactions leaving out the three-way interactions between displacement and tenure and experience and the two immigrant groups. Similarly, for reasons of parsimony, we only report the main, linear effects of education, experience, and tenure for workers in stable firms.
In Table 8 , the outcome is the average employment rate (columns 1 and 2) and log average earnings (columns 3 and 4) over the medium-term three-year period. When treatment effects are heterogeneous, the size of the immigrant-native effect differential depends on skills as well.
In the table, we report effect estimates of bankruptcy and downsizing evaluated at the mean values of educational attainment (12.2 years), experience (11.2), and tenure (5.5) in the LDC immigrant sample. Focusing on the specifications without initial firm fixed effects, we find that bankruptcy effects are more severe for workers with low education and long work experience.
Low skilled and older workers are less likely to find a new job and they suffer larger earnings losses following displacement. More importantly, the additional effects of bankruptcy and downsizing for LDC immigrants prevail. Evaluated at LDC immigrant averages of the human capital measures, the estimated LDC immigrant employment effect of a bankruptcy is -0.106 compared to the baseline estimate of -0.098 reported in Table 3 . For earnings, the LDC immigrant loss from a bankruptcy is estimated to be 0.355 log points compared to 0.328 in Table 3 . Table 8 here
The three-way interaction terms show that, for LDC immigrants, schooling protects less against losses from bankruptcy than is the case for native workers. Conversely, the disadvantage of low education is greater for natives than for LDC immigrants. Even so, evaluated at compulsory schooling, the additional LDC immigrant effects of bankruptcy remain negative, although statistically significant only in the specifications without initial firm fixed effects. According to the coefficient estimates in columns (1) and (3) Overall, when we allow for differential effects of displacement across the skill distribution, also permitting skill interactions to differ by immigrant background, the additional effects of bankruptcy and downsizing for LDC immigrants prevail within sample ranges of skills, with, regardless of specification, statistically significant interactions when evaluated at mean skills in the immigrant sample. The fact that LDC migrants hold different (observed) skills like education, work experience, and tenure from native workers cannot explain why they suffer more from negative shocks to their employer.
VI. Job loss and immigrant-native employment and earnings gaps
In this section, we discuss how the insights from our study of bankruptcy can inform on the role of involuntary job loss in explaining the lower employment and earnings of LDC immigrants compared to natives, focusing on transitions out of employment. Figure 4 illustrates the key phenomena we address. Starting from the base year of conditioned employment, the figure shows, separately for the three demographic groups considered, the fraction that remains employed (in any job) in subsequent years as well as earnings relative to those in the base year.
The differences that materialize between the groups are striking: While natives and EEA immigrants have very similar employment profiles, with employment rates well above 90 percent throughout the ten-year period, the employment rates of LDC immigrants drop sharply and end up at 80 percent. Similarly, while real earnings of natives and EEA immigrants over the interval grow by more than 20 percent, LDC immigrants experience little change in real earnings. The question we ask is to what extent job loss is a part of this process, explaining the differential developments in labor market outcomes. Further, does the major contribution come from differences in exposure to, or from differences in effects of, job loss? Figure 4 here
To assess the role of job loss, we need to make two sets of adjustments to observed displacement rates and effect estimates. First, because we cannot distinguish between voluntary and involuntary job separations, we impute overall job loss rates from observed inflows to registered unemployment. Table 9 reports observed rates of registered unemployment and adjusted rates of job loss over the 24-month period between the base year and the event year in our samples of LDC immigrants and natives. The row labelled A first
shows that among LDC immigrants in firms that go bankrupt, 52.1 percent registered with the employment agency as unemployed between the end of the base year and the bankruptcy. We know, however, that all these workers lost their job, so the adjusted job loss rate for this group is 100 percent (see row B). In other words, a certain fraction of LDC immigrants who lose their job either find a new job without registering as unemployed in the interim or withdraw from the labor market. According to column (1), this fraction is 47.9 percent (100-52.1). For native workers, the fraction is 56.5 percent (see col 1, rows C and D). The key idea behind our adjustments is that these fractions also apply to other workers who lose their job, regardless of whether their workplace was subject to bankruptcy or not. While we observe that 12.6 of all LDC immigrants and 4.6 percent of natives in our samples register as unemployed between the base year and the event year, the adjusted job loss rate is 24.1 percent for LDC immigrants and 10.5 percent for native workers (see column 3). In other words, when we also account for job separations from stable firms, LDC immigrants face a risk of job loss that is 2.3 times as large as that of natives. Table 9 here Second, we adjust the estimated effects of bankruptcy so that they reflect job loss. In order to correct estimates for "contamination bias" stemming from the fact that the control group (i.e., workers in stable firms) include some who also lose their job, we follow Bratsberg et al. (2013) and divide the bankruptcy effect estimates from Table 3 by one minus the job loss rate among workers in stable firms, as computed in Table 9 , column (2). For example, with a job loss rate of 10 percent from stable firms, we adjust for contamination bias by dividing the bankruptcy effect estimate by 0.9. The resulting job loss effects reported in Table 10 are slightly larger than the estimated effects of bankruptcy, both for LDC immigrants (row B) and natives (row D). Table 10 here Finally, with adjusted job loss rates and effect estimates from Tables 9 and 10 in hand, we calculate the contribution of job loss to the observed differences in employment change and earnings growth between immigrants and natives, both in the short run (i.e., between the base year and year 3) and the intermediate run (between the three-year base period and the post period, years 3-5). Row C of Table 11 reveals that, depending on the time interval considered, the employment rate of LDC immigrants declines by 6.2 and 7.5 percentage points more than that of natives, and the earnings growth of the immigrant group is 0.171 and 0.212 log points below that of natives. As in any decomposition exercise, the contributions of effect versus exposure will depend on the choice of two alternative weights. In our application, do we evaluate the contribution of differences in exposure using native or immigrant effects of job loss? To circumvent this issue, we instead use the average of the two weights in evaluating the size of the two components. The resultant components are reported in row D (difference in effects) and E (difference in exposure). In size, the two components are similar across columns, indicating that differential effects and differences in exposure contribute about the same to the overall effect of job loss on immigrant-native gaps in labor market outcomes. Row F sums the two components, and row G reports the ratio of the total contribution to the observed immigrant-native differential. As the final row shows, differential job loss explains 53 percent of the short-run gap in employment, and 62 percent of the short-run gap in earnings growth. In the intermediate run, the contribution of job loss is somewhat attenuated, explaining about one-third of the differential employment and earnings change of LDC immigrants and natives. Table 11 here In sum, over time immigrant workers from low-income countries experience inferior developments of employment and earnings compared to native workers. What the decomposition exercise shows, is that job loss accounts for a substantial portion of the evolution of immigrant-native gaps in labor market outcomes, with equal contributions from differences in exposure to and effects of job loss.
VII. Conclusion
In order to ensure lasting labor market integration of immigrants from developing countries, it may not be sufficient to facilitate successful labor market entry. The starting point of this paper was that the labor market performance of immigrants from low-income source countries falls below that of natives across many European host countries. Although there is a strong process of labor market assimilation for most immigrant groups during the first years after arrival, we have seen a disturbing tendency for this process to lose steam, and even go into reverse well before reaching employment parity with natives.
Based on administrative longitudinal data from Norway, we have shown in this paper that involuntary transitions out of employment are more frequent among immigrants from developing countries. In particular, LDC immigrants are much more exposed to adverse employment shocks hitting their employer than (similar) natives. From examinations of future outcomes among workers in firms that closed down due to bankruptcy, we also show that the consequences of such shocks -in terms of subsequent employment and earnings paths -are more severe for LDC immigrants than for native-born workers.
An important reason why immigrants from developing countries are more likely than other workers to leave employment is that they tend to work in precarious firms, with high risks of experiencing a downsizing or closure event in the near future. The overexposure of LDC immigrants to such events is 41 percent. Moreover, LDC immigrants typically have short job tenure and relatively low (and inflexible) qualifications, making them more likely to be selected for layoff during downsizing and reorganization processes. Overall, including displacements from stable firms, we estimate that the job loss rate of LDC immigrants is 2.3 times that of native workers.
It is less obvious why the individual consequences of job loss are found to be more severe for immigrants than for natives. One probable explanation is that upon job loss, the lack of general skills, including fluency in the native language, forms a barrier in the search for new employment. This interpretation is bolstered by analyses showing that the lower levels of education, experience, and tenure among LDC immigrants cannot explain why they suffer more from displacement. Even when we allow effects to vary across the skill distribution, the adverse consequences of bankruptcy and workplace downsizing are more severe for LDC immigrants than for natives and EEA immigrants. Skills may also interact with the social insurance system, as its progressive nature implies relatively high benefit replacement rates for persons with low potential labor earnings, contributing to lower return rates to employment among immigrants hit by job displacement.
Although we estimate the impacts of job loss on the basis of the relatively rare events of firm bankruptcy, we extrapolate our findings to the labor market as a whole. This extrapolation is based on the additional assumption that, within each demographic group, a given fraction of displaced workers will register as unemployed job seekers, implying that we can back out the total number of involuntary job losses from observed rates of registered unemployment.
Depending on the time horizon, we find that between 33 and 53 percent of the elevated probability of LDC immigrants to leave employment, and an even greater fraction of their lower earnings growth, can be attributed to the combination of higher involuntary job loss rates and more severe effects of job loss.
Our results show that lack of job stability and the more frequent transitions out of employment contribute importantly to the explanation why immigrants fail to integrate fully in the hostcountry labor market. For the rising rates of immigration to represent a solution to -rather than an aggravation of -the fiscal challenges facing many developed nations, integration efforts therefore need to have a long-term perspective, securing robust labor market attachment over the life course. Our findings point to the necessity of greater policy focus on integration efforts in relation to early immigrant job loss; e.g., in terms of activation and language skills enhancement. Note: Samples consist of private-sector workers age 25-55 with more than one year of tenure in a firm with at least 10 employees on Dec 31 of the base year, which is two years prior to any bankruptcy/downsizing event. Samples are further restricted to those with employment each year and not receiving benefits nor working in a firm that downsized during the 3-year period ending with the base year. Base years cover the period 1994 to 2010. The bankruptcy variable indicates that the firm filed for bankruptcy and the downsizing variable that the firm reduced its staff by at least 60 percent (but did not go bankrupt) during the calendar year two years after the base year. ***/**/*Statistically significant at 1/5/10 percent level. Note: Standard errors, clustered within individuals, are shown in parentheses. The dependent variable is an indicator for employment (col 1) or log earnings from work (col 3), or the average over the three year period (cols 2 and 4). Samples in cols (1) and (3) consist of those in the country on Dec 31 three years after the base year, and those in cols (2) and (4) five years after the base year, in addition to the sample restrictions detailed in note to Table 3 . Native samples are 10 percent random population extracts; regressions are weighted with frequency weights. All specifications control for year and 2-digit industry, as well as age and its square, education and its square, actual experience and its square, tenure and its square, log base-period earnings and gender, with all individual characteristics interacted with indicators for each of the two immigrant categories. ***/**/*Statistically significant at 1/5/10 percent level. Note: Standard errors, clustered within individuals, are shown in parentheses. Dependent variables are average employment or log average annual earnings over the period 3 to 5 years after the base year. Samples in cols (1)-(4) are restricted to workers the last year the firm is observed in the data. Samples in cols (5)-(6) exclude from the baseline sample workers in firm that do not downsize in year t+2 but go bankrupt or downsize in year t+3, t+4 or t+5; sample period is adjusted to [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . See also note to ***/**/*Statistically significant at 1/5/10 percent level. Note: Standard errors, clustered within individuals, are shown in parentheses. The dependent variable is the average employment rate (cols 1 and 2) or log average earnings (cols 3 and 4) over the three-year period preceding the base period (i.e., years t 0 -5 to t 0 -3). See also notes to Tables 3 and 6 . ***/**/*Statistically significant at 1/5/10 percent level. Note: Standard errors, clustered within individuals, are shown in parentheses. The dependent variable is the average employment rate (cols 1-2) or log average earnings (cols 3-4) over the three year period following any bankruptcy or downsizing (i.e., t 0 +3 to t 0 +5). The coefficients of bankrupt and downsize are evaluated at means of education, experience, and tenure in the LDC immigrant sample. See also notes to Tables 3 and 5. Tables 3 and 4. 
